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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of “irrational” investor’s sentiment on the abnormal
returns of low and high cap stock portfolios. The “rational” and “irrational” sentiments
are constructed using asset pricing fundamentals and the AAII sentiment survey data.
The abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between the actual and Fama-
French model returns. I note that due to higher limits of arbitrage for the small cap
stocks, the main effect of the “rational” and “irrational” sentiments on the small-cap
portfolio seems stronger than on the large-cap portfolio. Moreover, I note that the
mispricing of the large-cap stocks seems to revert to its fundamental value faster than
the low cap stocks, supporting the theory of greater limits of arbitrage in a small-cap
market than the large-cap market.
Furthermore, I discover that the “irrational” sentiment has statistically significant in-
teraction with the previous week’s large-cap mispricing on both the current week’s
small and large cap mispricing. I attribute this statistical significance to the broader
visibility of the large-cap stocks compared to the small-cap stocks. However, my inter-
pretation of the mispricing interaction would need to be further tested with the market
volume movements.
∗I would like to thank the Oberlin Economics Department for this valuable research opportunity. Specifi-
cally, I would like to thank Professor Cotter for the model suggestions, Professor Duca for the draft feedback,
and Professor Craig for not only the draft feedback but many office hours of guidance.
1 Introduction
In theoretical finance, many models, such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model,
assume that investors are rational, and asset prices are efficient. However, market anomalies
such as the Dot-com bubble of the 1990s and the price deviations of twin shares like Royal
Dutch/Shell Group in the 1990s raise doubts about the efficient market hypothesis, because
there are empirical instances of returns based on not on fundamental factors.
Therefore, instead of assuming the market efficiency, researchers such as Delong,
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) attempted to explain such anomalies by relaxing
the assumption of rational investors and instead introduce the model of both informed and
uninformed investors. In their model, they illustrated how the uninformed investors with
misleading or no information on the asset could bring more noise and volatility to the mar-
ket. Thus, since the uninformed investor’s influence on the fundamental price deviations is
unpredictable, the rational investors–at least in the short run–face the “noise trader risk”:
the risk of price further deviating from the rational investor’s calculation.
There have been arguments against the significant impact of noise trading from
economists scholars such as Milton Friedman (1953). He argues that the effect of irrational
agents is negligible. If the price of the risky asset were not equal to the present value that re-
flects all of the fundamentals, the rational investors would trade against the irrational agents
and drive the price back to its fundamental value. Therefore, the investors who mistakenly
judge the price of the risky asset can lose to the arbitrageurs, eventually disappearing from
the market. However, De Long et. al (1990) challenges this theory by presenting a model of
irrational agents–driven by its sentiment rather than the fundamental information–impacting
the price and volatility of the risky asset.
This paper attempts not to limit its analysis on De Long et al. (1990) model.
Instead, I will focus on the impact of the rational individual investors and the noise traders
on the mispricing. The variable for the rational individual investors is the sentiment survey
index explained by the asset pricing fundamentals, while the noise traders would be the un-
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explained residuals. Furthermore, the Fama-Macbeth rolling regression was used to predict
the Fama-French model’s theoretical price. Then, I construct the mispricing variable by
using the difference between the actual and constructed theoretical price.
However, the Fama-French predictions and the sentiment survey constructions are
one of the many ways to measure the deviations from the fundamental price and noise
trading. The regressions on the noise trader’s impact on the mispricing may be difficult to
interpret on its own. Therefore, this paper focuses on comparing the noise trader’s effect on
the mispricing of the low and high market cap stock portfolios instead of a single market
portfolio. This focus allows the interpretation of the noise trader to not solely focus on the
coefficients of the sentiment on the mispriced returns but instead on the varying effects of
the noise trader on different market cap portfolio.
Podolski et al. (2009) have concluded that small-cap stocks were prone to noise
trader risk compared to the large-cap stocks. Thus, not only do the two portfolio mispricing
allow noise trader’s relative impact on different market cap stocks, but also having two
mispricings allow another examination to the conclusion from Podolski et al. (2009).
Section (2) introduces a brief survey of the theory and the empirical studies of the
noise traders and mispricing to motivate the research on noise trader’s impact on mispric-
ing. Section (3) introduces the methodology and the construction of the noise trader and
mispricing variables. Section (4) describes the data of the constructed variables and the
data corrections. Section (5) describes the result of the noise trading on different market





Ramiah et al. (2015) defines a noise trader as “a market participant who makes
investment decisions without the use of finance fundamentals, exhibits poor market timing,
follows trends and tends to overreact or underreact to good and bad news.” Black (1986)
describes the noise trader as traders who “trade on noise as if it were information.” These
definitions of noise trader imply that the noise trader acts on noisy information, which is
not based on fundamental information.
While Black (1986) described the nature of noise traders, DeLong et al. (1990)
present a model that formalized the noise trader behavior and its impact on returns &
volatility. In their model, the noise traders as a group can influence the equilibrium of
the stock price. The changes of noise traders’ sentiment influence the price of the asset to
deviate from its fundamental value, creating a systematic risk and higher price volatility in
the market. This noise trader risk may reduce the attractiveness of the informed investors to
carry out the arbitrage. Therefore, DeLong et al. (1990) argue that because of the additional
risk that the uninformed (noise) traders expose to the market, the risk-averse arbitrageurs
will hold less risky portfolios than they would have without the noise traders. Thus, if there
are a significant group of noise traders dominating the market, the additional risk–and the
returns–that the noise traders create in the market would benefit the noise traders if they
are on average bullish and suffer if on average bearish. In other words, by driving out the
arbitrageurs, the noise traders can benefit from their “bullish” space and their overpriced
assets. Therefore, the noise traders may have positive relationship on the returns.
2.2 Firm Size difference
Because the rational investor needs access to information and stocks to carry out
the arbitrage, the limited information and the market equity can impact the price of the
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asset. For example, case studies of anomalies like Palm/ 3Com share in the early 2000s
illustrate that short sale restrictions can limit the arbitrage, resulting in further mispricing
of assets. Since the short lending fees are dependent on the supply and demand, and small-
cap stocks tend to be in a small market, the short sale market for the small-cap stocks tends
to be less liquid than the large-cap stocks. Therefore, when there is a sudden shift of strong
demand for short lending small-cap stocks, the costlier its lending fee, limiting the short-cap
stocks to be priced according to its fundamentals (Thaler and Lamont., 2002).
This observation is supported in the empirical study of Jones and Lamont (2002).
They found that small-cap stocks tend to have more short-sale constraints and, thus, more
expensive to short. Furthermore, small-sized firms may be more costly to gather their
fundamental information. Mitchell et al. (2002) argue that one of the most important factors
that limit arbitrage is the cost of collecting the appropriate information. Since small firms
tend to have less news coverage compared to large firms, small-cap stocks seem to have a
higher cost of information. Therefore, the asymmetry of the information cost may limit the
arbitrage opportunity in small market sized firm stocks.
Thus, I hypothesize that small-cap stocks are more vulnerable to noise trader risk.
I predict that the correlation between the noise trader risk and the weekly returns is stronger
for the small-cap stocks compared to the returns of the large-cap stock.
2.3 Measuring Investor Sentiment
Empirically, measuring the noise trader’s behavior is ambiguous and difficult. Nev-
ertheless, some studies like Lee et al. (1991) and Sias et al. (1995) indirectly used closed-end
funds to study the noise trader’s risk. Due to the nature of the closed-end funds, the intrinsic
value of the closed-end fund share can be calculated and compared with the market price
of the share. Thus, its difference can illustrate the closed-end fund’s behavior of investors–
including the noise traders–in the market. In contrast, other studies use the market sentiment
as a proxy to noise trader’s behavior. While there is still an on-going debate as to whether or
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not the market sentiment reflects the noise trader’s behavior (Ramiah et al., 2015), number
of researches used the market sentiment as a proxy to noise trading (Lee et al., 2002; Verma
and Verma, 2005; Podolski et al., 2009; Qiang and Shu-e, 2009; Corredor et al., 2015).
Brown (1999) attempted to test the investor sentiment as a proxy to the noise
trader’s behavior. Brown argues that following the noise traders theory from DeLong et al.
(1990), if the noise traders affect prices, the noisy signal1 of the market is a sentiment, and
the noise traders cause a systematic risk (volatility), then the sentiment should correlate
with the asset’s volatility. By using the volatility of the closed-end funds as a dependent
variable and the market sentiment as one of the independent variables, Brown concluded
that the deviation of the average investor sentiment is associated with the increases in the
volatility of the closed-end funds. Thus, Brown (1990) implies that when the investors’
sentiments are volatile, so does the number of trades in the closed ends funds, increasing
the closed-end funds’ volatility. Therefore, the investor sentiment is a valid measure of noise
trader behavior.
Following Brown (1990)’s conclusion, I assume that the investor’s sentiment is an
appropriate characterization of the noise traders’ behavior. There are indirect and direct
methods to measure an investor’s sentiment. The indirect method used by Baker and Wurgler
(2006 and 2007), consisted of using macroeconomic factors. For the direct measure of investor
sentiment, a handful of studies uses investor’s intelligence data or the American Association
of Individual Investors (AAII) surveys.
The investor’s intelligence data is from the editors of Investors’ Intelligence, which
reads and rates over 100 advisory services on the market movements (Lee et al., 2002; Corre-
dor et al., 2015). On the other hand, AAII data is the survey data from the American
Association of individual investors. Before 2000, every week, AAII conducts the survey
via mail by randomly selects from approximately 100,000 AAII members and asks the par-
ticipants to predict the likely direction of the stock market during the six months. AAII
1From Fisher Black (1986), the noisy signal refers to the opposite of the information, false information,
or hype of the assets instead of information of the fundamentals.
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then measures the percentage of participants responding “up” as bullish, “down” as bearish,
and “the same” as neutral (Corredor et al., 2015). However, the beginning of 2000, AAII
conducted its survey on-line.2
The average AAII member is a male in his late-50s with a graduate degree. More-
over, over half of the AAII members have an investment with over $500,000. Therefore,
the AAII sentiment survey represents the market sentiment of “hands-on” active individual
investors.
Thus, investor’s intelligence is a measure of the market’s sentiment from analyzing
a handful of analysts, while the AAII survey measures the sentiment directly from the in-
vestors. While Brown and Cliff (2005) and W. Y. Lee et al. (2002) used investor’s intelligence
data, Verma and Verma (2006) and P. Corredor et al. (2015) used AAII as an investor’s sen-
timent and a proxy for the noise trader’s behavior. An indirect measure of sentiment was
constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006 and 2007). They constructed a sentiment variable
by combining trading volume, dividend premium, closed-end fund discount, number and the
first-day returns on IPOs, and the equity share in new issues.
However, there may be problems of using indirect sentiment measures along with
other macroeconomic variables in a model. Specifically, in P. Corredor et al. (2015), they
argued that when attempting to examine the role of investor sentiment on spot and futures
markets, using macroeconomic data to indirectly measure the sentiment may bias the result
since the macroeconomic variables would be used for independent (sentiment construction)
and dependent variables (spots and futures returns) instead of actual behavior of the in-
vestors. Moreover, since P. Corredor et al. (2015) was interested in a variable that proxies
the observation of noise trader behavior, the AAII’s nature of the target respondent and the
survey construction makes AAII survey the preferred measure of the noise trader behavior.
Furthermore, the previously mentioned study of investor sentiment as a proxy of noise trader
risk (Brown, 1999) used AAII as investor sentiment.3 Thus, the AAII survey seems to be an
2https://www.aaii.com/journal/sentimentsurveyarticle
3The assumption being that the volatility of the closed-end fund represents the systematic risk.
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appropriate variable for investor sentiment and noise trader behavior.
However, AAII survey results contain individual investors, not necessarily the unin-
formed (noise trader) individual investor. Thus, studies like Brown and Cliff (2005), Verma
and Verma (2005), Verma et al. (2008), and Sayim et al. (2013) controlled for the macroe-
conomic variables that may have influenced the investor sentiment. Since the noise trader
is an investor without the fundamental knowledge of the market, only part of the overall
investor sentiment may reflect the behavior of the noise trader. Therefore, Brown and Cliff
(2005) regressed the investor sentiment variable along with popular variables in asset pricing
literature that influence the market valuation, such as treasury bill returns and Fama french
factors. Using the monthly intervals data, Verma and Verma (2005), Verma et al. (2008),
and Sayim et al. (2013) were able to examine the impact of both the rational (fundamental
and information-based) investor and irrational investor sentiment on asset returns by first
regressing the sentiment variable on fundamentals as shown below:




γi Fundi,t ` ξt , where (1)
Sentt is the investor sentiment data like AAII survey, γ0 is the constant, γi is the parameter
estimate of the impact on the fundamental variable to Sentt, and ξt is the error term. After
the regression, Verma and Verma (2005), Verma et al. (2008), and Sayim et al. (2013) used
the sentiment estimate ˆSentt as the rational investor and ξt as the irrational investor.
2.4 Measuring Mispricing
To calculate the mispricing of an asset, studies have tried to calculate a theoretical
value based on stock’s fundamentals or factor models. Studies like Doukas et al. (2010) and
Aabo et al. (2017) measured the fundamental return of each stock rather than a portfolio
by using the firm’s fundamental information such as residual income value of the firm or
book and net income value of the firm. On the other hand, studies such as Guidolin and
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Ricci (2010) and Cao and Han (2016) utilized the Fama-French 3-factor model 4 to calculate
the fundamental return of stocks. Afterward, they took the difference between the observed
return of the stock and the Fama-French prediction to estimate the mispricing measure.
This mispricing measure was used as the error of the factor pricing model in Joon and Yang
(2016).
2.5 Contribution
This paper contributes to the growing literature of noise trader and market anoma-
lies by examining the noise trader and the rational investor’s impact on the mispricing of
small-cap and large-cap portfolios. This approach differs from Podolski et al. (2009) since I
am interested in examining the noise traders in United States with AAII survey data rather
than Australia data with the broker’s net initiated order flows as an investor’s proxy.
Furthermore, while Podolski et al. (2009) and Qadan and Aharon (2019) studied
the impact of sentiment on firm sizes and stock-cap sizes, respectively, the two studies did not
separate the rational and irrational sentiments. However, taking into consideration that the
individual investors may have rational and non-informed judgments, I use methods similar
to Verma et al. (2008), Verma and Verma (2005), and Sayim et al. (2013) to separate the
rational and irrational individual investors.
Studies have found that arbitrageurs care about their short-term investment perfor-
mance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) and that the arbitrage is limited when arbitrageurs have
shorter investor horizons than noise traders (DeLong et al., 1990). Thus, the noise trader’s
impact may be more evident during the frequent period (Cao and Han, 2016). Therefore,
unlike Verma et al. (2008), Verma and Verma (2005), and Sayim et al. (2013), I examine the
impact of noise traders on a weekly basis rather than monthly intervals.
Taking into consideration the noise trader theory, noise trader’s impact on firm size
difference, and the construction of our mispricing model, I hypothesize the following:
4For more information on Fama–French three-factor model, see appendix (9.1)
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H1: The small-cap stock portfolio will have a higher deviation from its fundamental
returns compared to the high-cap stock portfolio.
H2: The irrational investor sentiment will have positive association to the weekly
mispriced returns
H3: The impact of irrational individual investor (noise trader) on mispricing will be
more significant for the low-cap stock portfolio compared to the high-cap stock portfolio
Note that the H2 does not mean the noise traders will earn higher or lower returns.
Instead, the focus of this paper is restricted to the impact of portfolio’s mispriced returns,
not the expected value of noise traders or rational investors.
3 Model and Methodology
There have been several measures of mispricing in the literature. In T. Aabo et
al. (2017), they have used several mispricing models on groups of stocks, such as utilizing
residual income value of the firm or using the book and net income value of the firm. However,
these mispricing measures are for the individual firm stocks rather than a portfolio. Since
factor models can be used to valuate a stock or a portfolio, the Fama-French 3-factor model
was chosen to model the fundamental price of the small and large-cap stock portfolios.
As described in Guidolin and Ricci (2010), the price predicted by the Fama-French
model will be the price in the absence of arbitrage risk and other limits to arbitrage. While
several studies have noted that each factor in the Fama-French model may constitute a
market anomaly factor, the combination of the three factors to produce a single measure
should reduce the residual noise and allow a more accurate measure of the theoretical price.
Therefore, the Fama-French 3-factor model was used as an intrinsic rate of return for the
small and large-cap stocks portfolios. The difference between the Fama-French prediction
and the actual return is the mispricing—the return not explained by the market risk premium
and the size and value premium.
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Similar to Joon and Yang (2016), which tested the Fama French model’s predictabil-
ity strength, I use the Fama-French three-factor model to regress on previous years and use
that regression coefficient to predict the current return. This way, the Fama-French βj co-
efficients are adjusted depending on the time. Furthermore, this paper assumed that the
mispriced returns is the difference between the observed returns and the returns that would
prevail in the absence of noise traders.
3.1 Mispricing
The mispricing is defined as follows: for each year i, take the weekly portfolio
returns Ri, risk-free rate Rf , and the Fama-French factors, which are RMkt, SMB, and
HML from years pi ´ 6q to pi ´ 1q. Then the theoretical Fama-French 3 factor model is
regressed using OLS as
Ri,t ´Rf,t “ β1,t pRMkt,t, Rf,tq ` β2,t SMBt ` β3,t HMLt ` εt, (2)
which would result in the coefficient estimates β̂1, β̂2, and β̂3 from the years pi´ 6q to pi´ 1q
sample. For the year i, the estimated Fama-French return is
Ri,t ´Rf,t “ β̂1 pRMkt,t ´Rf,tq ` β̂2 SMBt ` β̂3 HMLt, where (3)
Ri,t ´Rf,t is the market excess expected return.
The mispricing, or the difference between the actual and the predicted, is
Mispriced “ pRi,t ´Rf,tq ´Ri,t ´Rf,t . (4)
Note that the intercept is not included in the Fama French regression (2) since we are
interested in the abnormal return of the portfolio. Thus, α value would be included in the
Mispriced variable. This is a process also used by researchers such as Chae and Yang (2016).
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The weekly returns instead of monthly or daily returns were used as our metric
since according to Cao and Han (2016), Koller et al. (2010), and Koller et al. (2010), daily
returns may lead to an extreme returns in certain days influencing the returns while the
monthly returns may not represent the frequent investor’s sentiment affecting the future
returns.
Moreover, five years of weekly returns were used for the Fama-French Bi estimation,
since according to Cao and Han (2016) and Koller et al. (2010), five years of data was chosen
as a compromise between precise estimates and to avoid too recent systematic biases.
This paper will have two different mispriced variables: MispricedL20t for small-cap
stocks portfolio and MispricedH20t, for a large-cap stocks portfolio.
3.2 Rational and Irrational sentiments
A similar process from Verma and Verma (2005), Verma et al. (2008), and Sayim et
al. (2013) was used to construct the sentiment variables. Using an investor survey variable
Sent and I number of fundamental information, Fundi for i “ 1, ...., I, the rational and
irrational sentiments were modeled using the OLS regression as the equation (1):




γi Fundi,t ` ξt . (5)
After estimating γ0 and all of the γi’s, we estimate the rational and irrational sentiment as
follows:




γ̂i Fundi,t , (6)
and Irrationalt “ ξt. Intuitively, the Rationalt is the investor’s sentiment explained by the
fundamental variables at time t while the Irrationalt is the part of the sentiment survey
that is not explained by the fundamental variables. This paper assumes that the Irrationalt
is the proxy for the noise trader’s behavior, and the set of Fundi variables contain justifiable
information (e.g. macroeconomic state) for an appropriate outlook of the future market.
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4 Data
4.1 Returns and Mispricing
The daily returns on a portfolio of the bottom 20% and a portfolio of top 20%
market cap stocks were from the Kenneth R. French’s website. The daily returns on the two
portfolios were accumulated to weekly returns to match the weekly Fama French 3 factors.
For more information on the weekly returns calculations, see appendix. Furthermore, the
risk-free weekly rate, the excess return on the market, SMB, and HML are from French’s
website. Due to AAII conducting the survey on-line in 2000, only the sentiment survey after
2000 was used in our analysis. Thus, only the Fama-French returns from 2000 to Oct-2019
were constructed.
For brevity, throughout this paper, the “low cap” portfolio refers to the portfolio
with stocks in the bottom 20% of the market cap, while the “high cap” portfolio refers to
the portfolio with shares in the top 20% of the market cap.
Table 1: Returns and Fama-French Statistics
Data from Jan-07-2000 to Oct-25-2019. Note that MispricedL20t and MispricedH20t vari-
ables in year 2000 to 2005 were constructed from the Fama-French factors and returns data
in years 1995 to 2000. RL20t and RH20t are excess returns for low 20 percentile market
cap portfolio and high 20 percentile market cap portfolio.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Mktt 1,034 0.109 2.472 ´18.000 0.235 12.610
SMBt 1,034 0.045 1.367 ´10.710 0.070 6.990
HMLt 1,034 0.057 1.490 ´8.710 ´0.005 9.940
RL20t 1,034 0.161 3.026 ´21.538 0.324 15.078
RH20t 1,034 0.097 2.376 ´18.266 0.217 11.502
FFL20t 1,034 0.168 2.920 ´19.305 0.338 12.870
FFH20t 1,034 0.095 2.378 ´18.316 0.192 12.178
MispricedL20t 1,034 ´0.007 0.660 ´2.829 ´0.006 4.484
MispricedH20t 1,034 0.002 0.137 ´0.910 ´0.001 0.905
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the Fama French factors, actual
weekly returns, predicted returns, and the mispriced returns. The three factors (Mkt, SMB,
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HML) and the weekly returns are from the Fama-French website. The estimated returns
were constructed every year from the July of year t to July of year t + 1 by using the actual
returns and Fama French factors from year pt ´ 6q to pt ´ 1q to estimate the coefficients
and using those coefficients to estimated the returns from the July of year t to July of year
t` 1.5 Since the Fama-French coefficients were estimated every year t from the end of June
to the end of June at year t` 1, the Fama-French beta coefficients were estimated 21 times
per each low and high cap portfolios to construct the Mispricedt variables. The Mispricedt
variables are the difference between the actual and Fama-French predicted returns.
The mean of RL20t and RH20t are weekly returns of 0.161 percent and 0.097
percent, respectively. In contrast, the mean of predicted returns (FFL20t and FFH20t)
are 0.168 percent and 0.095 percent, respectively. The Fama-French returns for low cap
seem to have slightly more bullish estimation than the high cap. Nevertheless, the standard
deviation for both the estimated and the actual returns are around 2.3 to 3.1, indicating that
the difference of the mean between low and high cap stock portfolios are not statistically
different. One interesting note is the Mispricedt variables. The mean of MispricedL20t is
around -0.007 percent, while the mean of MispricedH20t is 0.002 percent. Furthermore, the
standard deviation is 0.660 for MispricedL20t while 0.137 for the MispricedH20t. While
the mispricing for both portfolios is essentially around zero, the volatility of MispricedL20t
is almost six times higher than MispricedH20t, indicating that the low cap stocks more
often deviates from the Fama-French predicted model compared to the high cap stocks.
Additional illustrations of the small and large-cap returns and the fundamental
returns are in figures 1 through 4. Note that for the figure 1, one can see that the colored
and the outlined circles tend to mismatch each other often, illustrating that the low cap
stocks tend to deviate from the theoretical price more often than the high-cap stocks in
figure 2. This illustration is more evident in figure 4, in which after taking the difference
between the actual and the Fama-French predicted returns, one can see that the low cap
5For more information, visit French’s website at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/
ken.french/.
13
portfolio exhibits much higher deviation from the Fama-French predicted returns.
Figure 1: Small-Cap stocks Returns: Actual vs. Predicted
Shaded regions indicate recession, according to FRED on US Business Cycle. Plotly
library from python was used to construct the graphs.
Figure 2: Large-Cap stocks Returns: Actual vs. Predicted
14
Figure 3: Mispricing Returns: from Jan 07, 2000, to October 25, 2019
Shaded regions indicate recession, according to FRED on US Business Cycle. The
Mispricing of low and high cap indicates the difference between the actual weekly
returns and Fama-French 3-factor model predicted returns. The rate is in weekly
returns.
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4.2 Rational and Irrational Sentiments
The AAII survey data is directly from American Association of Individual Investors
website. The “Bull-Bear” spread in the data was used as the individual investor sentiment
variable. For the macroeconomic factors, a list of commonly used and accepted variables
in asset pricing literature from Verma and Verma (2005), Verma et al. (2008), and Sayim
et al. (2013) were used as the fundamental factors. Specifically, they are (i) SMB, HML,
Mkt—which are the Fama-French factors, (ii) BAaa as the business condition, calculated
by subtracting the difference in yields on Baa and Aaa corporate bonds, (iii) T10Y 3M as
the future economic expectations variable, calculated by the difference between 10-year US
treasury bond and 3-month US treasury bond, (iv) Dividend as the S & P 500 dividend
yield, (v) MoM as the momentum factor, measured by the difference between the average
return on two high prior and the average return on the low prior return portfolios, (vi)
Inflation as the monthly change in the consumer price index, (vii) IPI as the economic
growth, calculated by the monthly change of the industrial production index, (viii) T30 as the
short term interest rate, measured as the 1 month Treasury yield, (ix) T90 T30 as economic
risk premium, measured as the difference in yields on 3-month and 1-month Treasury bills.
The data on SMB, HML, Mkt, MoM , T30 are from the Fama-French web-
site. The monthly dividend yields is from Robert Shiller’s webpage.The BAaa, T10Y 3M ,
Inflation, IPI, and T90 are from the FRED website. Note that since T30 is from the
Fama-French website, T90 T30 variable was constructed by taking the difference of the T90
and T30 values, after formatting for T90 to have consistent compounding interest yields as
T30. See appendix for detailed construction of T90 T30.6
Dividend is not specifically the dividend yield of the low-cap and high-cap stock
portfolios. Instead, Dividend will be used as a market wide effect. This assumption also has
been used by Sayim et al. (2013), Verma et al. (2008), Qadan and Aharon (2019), in which
their dependent variable is the weighted average of different market indices but still utilized
6For more information about constructing T30 and T90 T30, see appendix (9.3).
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the Dividend of S &P 500 as their dividend effect.
The descriptive statistics for SMB, HML, and Mkt are illustrated in table 1 while
the rest of the fundamental factors and the sentiment data is illustrated in table 2. For more
information on variables, see appendix 9.4, table 14.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Sentiment and Macroeconomic Factors
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
AAII 1,034 0.073 0.180 ´0.514 0.069 0.629
MoM 1,034 0.224 5.268 ´34.390 0.345 18.360
Inflation 1,034 0.157 0.258 ´1.621 0.170 1.139
IPI 1,034 0.067 0.643 ´4.369 0.119 1.578
T90-T30 1,034 0.002 0.021 ´0.110 0.000 0.080
BAaa 1,034 1.046 0.430 0.520 0.930 3.470
cBAaa 1,034 0.000 0.045 ´0.230 0.000 0.490
T10Y3M 1,034 1.776 1.167 ´0.766 1.923 3.782
cT10Y3M 1,034 ´0.001 0.119 ´0.870 ´0.008 0.876
Dividend 1,034 1.887 0.374 1.110 1.900 3.600
cDividend 1,034 0.001 0.040 ´0.450 0.000 0.590
chDividend 1,034 0.002 0.083 ´0.450 ´0.010 0.590
T30 1,034 0.134 0.152 0.000 0.090 0.560
cT30 1,034 ´0.000 0.012 ´0.160 0.000 0.080
chT30 1,034 ´0.001 0.025 ´0.160 0.000 0.080
Unfortunately, unlike Verma et al. (2008), BAaa, T10Y 3M , Dividend, and T30
variables exhibited non-stationary characteristics. When the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
was used to test for stationary of the fundamental variables, the four variables did not
pass the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for stationarity.7 Therefore, the change of the
variable was used instead to make the variables stationary. From examining the four non-
stationary variables, it seemed like during the year 2008, BAaa, T10Y 3M , Dividend, and
T30 exhibited a sharp trend (either increasing–Dividend, BAaa, T10Y 3M , or decreasing–
T30). Since Verma et al. (2008) used data from 1988 to 2004, they may have avoided the
issue of non-stationary by having the a longer sample horizon and the data before 2008.
7R package tseries and the function adf.test was used to test for the stationary. The lag order of 10 was
used
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However, Sayim et al. (2013) used the data from 1999 to 2010. With such a short sample
horizon and the recession during 2008 and 2009, I expected Sayim et al. (2013) to have
experienced non-stationary variables. However, their paper indicates that their variables all
pass the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Test but did not include the results of the unit
root tests.
The table 3 includes both the original and the change of variables for BAaa,
T10Y 3M , Dividend, and T30. Note that the new variables have “∆” prefix attached.
Since Dividend and T30 are monthly data, ∆wDividend and ∆wT30 represents the weekly
changes of the monthly data propagated to weekly. As a result, only the first week of the
month in ∆wDividend and ∆wT30 may have value other than zero. Thus, the monthly
change of dividends and the short term interest rate was also calculated before propagating
to weekly. ∆MDividend and ∆MT30 represents the monthly change of dividend and the
1-month Treasury yield propagated to weekly.
Table 3: Cross-correlations of US market fundamentals and Sentiment
AAII SMB HML Mkt MoM Inflation IPI T90 T30 BAaa ∆wBAaa T10Y3M ∆wT10Y3M Dividend ∆wDividend ∆MDividend T30 ∆wT30 ∆MT30
AAII 1
SMB 0.11 1
HML 0.09 -0.22 1
Mkt 0.11 0.23 0.07 1
MoM -0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.14 1
Inflation 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 1
IPI 0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.05 1
T90 T30 0.1 0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.23 1
BAaa -0.29 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.19 -0.28 -0.4 -0.1 1
∆wBAaa -0.13 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.1 -0.24 0.03 -0.09 0.05 1
T10Y3M 0.06 0.06 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.03 0.06 0.28 -0.03 1
∆wT10Y3M 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.21 -0.12 0.1 -0.08 -0.2 0.03 -0.07 0.06 1
Dividend -0.36 -0.01 -0.08 0.07 -0.27 -0.18 -0.25 0.04 0.7 -0.11 0.28 0.01 1
∆wDividend -0.1 -0.07 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.18 -0.09 -0.04 0.1 0.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 1
∆MDividend -0.15 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.36 -0.18 -0.08 0.22 0.26 -0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.48 1
T30 0.12 -0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.06 0.15 -0.03 -0.21 -0.26 0.06 -0.74 0.02 -0.59 0.03 0.05 1
∆wT30 0.03 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.06 0.06 0.02 -0.12 -0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0 -0.15 -0.07 0.02 1
∆MT30 0.05 -0.1 0.05 0.01 -0.14 0.12 0.03 -0.25 -0.14 -0.07 -0.06 -0.08 -0.01 -0.07 -0.15 0.03 0.48 1
Table 4 reports the regression using the fundamental variables with or without ad-
justing for stationary characteristics. Since the AAII survey data after 2000 was conducted
through online, I’ve assumed no or insignificant lag between the survey response and its pub-
lication. Therefore, the macroeconomic variables and the AAII data were regressed without
any lags.8 The column (1), “Original”, represents the asset pricing variables without station-
8Regressing the asset pricing variables without any lags on the AAII survey variable is consistent with
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arity check. The column (2), “All”, represents using stationary check for the monthly vari-
ables Dividend and T30 by taking the weekly difference. The column (3), “Weeks.Months”,
represents the regression with monthly changes of Dividend and T30 propagated to weekly
intervals. As expected, the “Original” regression provided higher R2. Verma et al. (2008)
had R2 of 0.3 while Sayim et al. (2013) had R2 of 0.25. Therefore, my R2 of 0.24 seems
within a credible range. However, adjusting for the stationary, we see that the R2 drops to
0.07 and 0.08 when taken into account both the weekly and monthly change as illustrated
in columns (2) and (3). As expected, using the difference of the monthly change instead of
weekly change on monthly variables Dividend and T30 seem to explain more variations but
by only 0.01 R2 increase. While the drop is slightly disheartening, we can interpret that
the lower R2 may mean that after taking care of the unit root of our variables, there are
wider ranges of residual (Irrational) values unexplained by fundamental factors. Therefore,
lower R2 does not mean that our Rational variable is erroneous. After taking into account
the stationarity, the “Weeks.Months” regression in column (3) will be used to construct our
Rational and Irrational variables.
The table 5 to 7 are the summary statistics of both Rational and Irrational vari-
ables. From the summary statistics, the mean, median, and the volatility of the Rational
variable seems to be almost the same throughout the period when Irrational is bullish or
bearish. The figure 4 is a time series graph illustrating the relationship between Rational
and Irrational variables. Note that during the recession period, the Rational Bull-Bear
spreads is around or under 0, illustrating that the Rational sentiment seems to react to the
market factors appropriately. On the other hand, we see much volatile movement in our
Irrational variable through out our sample size time interval.
Verma et al. (2008), Verma and Verma (2005), and Sayim et al. (2013).
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Table 4: Effects of US market fundamentals on the individual investor’s sentiment
All three regressions have AAII—the weekly individual investor sentiment survey variable—as
the dependend variable. The column (1) is the regression of the asset pricing variables without the
stationarity correction. The column (2) is the regression with the stationarity correction and the
weekly change of the monthly variables Dividend and T30, and the weekly change of the weekly
variables BAaa and T10Y 3M . The column (3) is the regression with the stationarity correction




SMB 0.010˚˚˚ 0.014˚˚˚ 0.014˚˚˚
p0.004q p0.004q p0.004q
HML 0.007˚ 0.013˚˚˚ 0.013˚˚˚
p0.003q p0.004q p0.004q
Mkt 0.006˚˚˚ 0.004˚ 0.005˚
p0.002q p0.002q p0.002q
MoM ´0.006˚˚˚ ´0.002 ´0.002
p0.001q p0.001q p0.001q
Inflation ´0.055˚˚˚ ´0.030 ´0.051˚˚
p0.020q p0.022q p0.023q
IPI ´0.014 0.030˚˚˚ 0.025˚˚˚
p0.009q p0.009q p0.009q

























Constant 0.354˚˚˚ 0.073˚˚˚ 0.077˚˚˚
p0.057q p0.006q p0.007q
Observations 1,034 1,034 1,034
R2 0.236 0.071 0.080
Adjusted R2 0.228 0.061 0.070
Notes: ˚˚˚Significant at the 1 percent level.
˚˚Significant at the 5 percent level.
˚Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 5: Full Sample
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Rational 1, 033 0.073 0.051 ´0.295 0.075 0.330
Irrational 1, 033 ´0.000 0.172 ´0.455 ´0.010 0.544
Table 6: Bullish Sample: Irrational ą 0
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Rational 495 0.072 0.045 ´0.174 0.077 0.170
Irrational 495 0.142 0.111 0.000 0.115 0.544
Table 7: Bearish Sample: Irrational ă 0
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Rational 538 0.073 0.056 ´0.295 0.073 0.330
Irrational 538 ´0.132 0.098 ´0.455 ´0.114 ´0.000
Figure 4: Sentiment: from Jan 07, 2000, to October 25, 2019
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5 Results
Note that throughout this section, there will be only 1033 observations per regres-
sion. This is due to the lag of Rational and Irrational variables.
The bivariate correlations of our interested variables are illustrated in table 8. Note
that there seems to be a slightly negative correlation between the current and the previous
week’s mispricing as indicated by the correlations of MisrpciedL20t & MispricedL20t´1 and
MispricedH20t & MispricedH20t´1. This negative correlation between the past and current
week’s mispricing seem to suggest a price correction from the market for both portfolios.
Other high correlations are RL20t´1 & RH20t´1 and Rationalt & Rationalt´1, which are
0.809 and 0.889 respectively. The correlation of RL20t´1 & RH20t´1 is realistic since as a
overall market, if the economy is doing well (poorly), then the returns of both the high and
low market may go up (down). The correlation Rationalt & Rationalt´1 illustrates that the
positive or negative sentiments explained by the fundamentals in one week may be related
to the following week.
Table 8: Cross-correlations of Fama-French excess returns, Market excess returns, and the
Sentiments
MispricedL20t MispricedH20t MispricedL20t-1 MispricedH20t-1 RL20t-1 RH20t-1 Rationalt Irrationalt Rationalt-1 Irrationalt-1
MispricedL20t 1
MispricedH20t -0.045 1
MispricedL20t-1 -0.054 0.041 1
MispricedH20t-1 0.045 -0.11 -0.036 1
RL20t-1 0.259 -0.024 0.266 0.02 1
RH20t-1 0.218 -0.009 0.019 0.017 0.809 1
Rationalt 0.075 0.081 0.054 0.068 0.07 0.021 1
Irrationalt 0.166 -0.024 0.059 0.031 0.386 0.373 -0.005 1
Rationalt-1 0.096 0.061 0.083 0.085 0.318 0.214 0.889 0.116 1
Irrationalt-1 0.025 0.015 0.173 -0.02 0.04 -0.001 0.01 0.522 0 1
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5.1 Regressing without Interactions
Before examining how the noise traders may react to the past information and
the mispricing, this section covers how the rational and irrational (noise traders) sentiment
individually impact the mispricing of low and high cap portfolios. The main equation in this
section is as follows:









λ3,iIrrationalt´i ` λ4Mispriced 20t´1 ` λ5X, (7)
where Mispriced 20t´1 is either MispricedL20t or MispricedH20t and X is either RL20t´1,
FFL20t1 , MispricedH20t´1 or RH20t´1, FFH20t1 ,MispricedL20t´1.
The OLS regression is on table 9. The column (1) and (5) are the impact of Rationalt
and Irrationalt variables on low and high cap portfolio mispricing. The column (2) and (6) test
the impact of low (high) cap portfolio’s previous market excess returns on the current mispricing
of high (low) cap portfolio. Thus, RH20t´1 and RL20t´1 were added to exmine the impact of
previous week’s returns from the opposite market-cap side of the market to the current mispric-
ing. The column (3) and (7) test the impact of last week’s Fama-French predicted low (high)
cap portfolio returns on the current high (low) cap mispricing. The column (4) and (8) test the
impact of other portfolio’s mispricing on the current respective portfolios (e.g. MispricedH20t´1
on MispricedL20t).
The significant coefficients of Rationalt and Irrationalt on MispricedL20t (columns
(1) through (4)) illustrate that the optimistic and pessimistic outlook for both Rationalt and
Irrationalt uniquely influence the mispricing of low cap stocks while do not seem to have an
influence on high cap stocks. So far, this is consistent with Mitchell et al. (2002) and Podolski et
al. (2009). Investor’s sentiment—whether based on fundamental factors or a noise—seem to have
a positive and statistically significant influence on the mispricing of the low cap portfolio while not
on the mispricing of the high cap portfolio.
Another interesting coefficients are MispricedL20t´1 in columns (1) through (4) and
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MispricedH20t´1 in columns (5) through (8). While this paper focuses on the market anoma-
lies, the negative and significant coefficients suggest the mean-reversal; the positive (negative)
mispricing of time t negatively (positively) influence the next week’s mispricing at time t ` 1.
Nevertheless, comparing the coefficients of previous mispricing effect, even though the descriptive
statistics in table 1 indicate that the value range and volatility is higher for MispricedL20t com-
pared to MispricedH20t, the coefficient of MispricedH20t´1 is around ´0.11, almost twice more
negative than the coefficient of MispricedL20t´1. Although further tests and scrutiny are needed,
the coefficients may imply that the mispricing of high cap stocks tend to revert to their average
more rapidly than the mispricing of small cap stocks.
In columns (2), (3), (6), and (7), the coefficients of RH20t´1 and FFLt´1 compared to
RL20t´1 and FFHt´1 may either indicate that the past actual returns and Fama French predicted
returns may have information that impacts the mispricing of the low cap market. However, the
insignificant MispricedH20t´1 in column (4) may indicate that the small cap market does not take
into consideration how much the high cap market over or under performed compared to the Fama-
French model. However, as indicated by the significant coefficients from RH20t´1 and FFH20t´1
in columns (5) and (8), the high cap portfolio information influences the mispricing of the low cap
portfolio. One explanation is that the high cap market returns may include a systematic market
wide risk or the additional “hype” that impact the mispricing of the low cap market. Since small
firms are generally less covered by analysts compared to the large cap stocks, the large cap stocks
coverage—and their returns—may influence the perspective of the market as whole, including the
mispricing of the small cap stocks.
24
Table 9: OLS: Mispriced without interactions
Columns (1) to (4) are regressions of sentiment and lagged variables on MispriciedL20t. Columns (5)
to (8) are regressions on MispricedH20t. All of the regressions have high F statistics to be signficicant
at the 1 percent level.
MispricedL20t MispricedH20t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rationalt 1.403
˚˚˚ 1.519˚˚˚ 1.519˚˚˚ 1.394˚˚˚ ´0.020 ´0.041 ´0.048 ´0.020
p0.486q p0.481q p0.482q p0.486q p0.104q p0.106q p0.106q p0.104q
Irrationalt 0.750
˚˚˚ 0.493˚˚˚ 0.501˚˚˚ 0.741˚˚˚ ´0.004 0.006 0.011 ´0.002
p0.153q p0.160q p0.160q p0.153q p0.033q p0.034q p0.035q p0.033q
Rationalt-1 0.642 ´0.037 ´0.026 0.651 0.014 0.077 0.096 0.002
p0.501q p0.515q p0.516q p0.501q p0.106q p0.124q p0.124q p0.107q
Irrationalt-1 ´0.314
˚˚ ´0.161 ´0.165 ´0.312˚˚ 0.040 0.036 0.032 0.035
p0.151q p0.153q p0.153q p0.151q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q
MispricedL20t-1 ´0.067
˚˚ ´0.067˚˚ ´0.068˚˚ ´0.066˚˚ 0.006
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.007q
MispricedH20t-1 0.153 ´0.110
˚˚˚ ´0.110˚˚˚ ´0.110˚˚˚ ´0.109˚˚˚











Constant ´0.159˚˚˚ ´0.122˚˚˚ ´0.123˚˚˚ ´0.159˚˚˚ 0.002 ´0.000 ´0.001 0.003
p0.038q p0.039q p0.039q p0.038q p0.008q p0.009q p0.009q p0.008q
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
R2 0.052 0.073 0.072 0.053 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.015
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.067 0.067 0.047 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.009
Notes: ˚˚˚Significant at the 1 percent level.
˚˚Significant at the 5 percent level.
˚Significant at the 10 percent level.
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5.2 Regressing with Interactions
Since the impact of Rationalt and Irrationalt sentiments may be influenced by the previ-
ous week’s mispricing, the sentiment and the previous mispricing interaction variables were added.
The regression results with interaction variables are illustrated in table 10.9
Similar to the result from table 9, in columns (1) to (4), we see that Rationalt and
Irrationalt are positive and significant. However, the inclusion of the interaction terms have
slightly lowered the coefficients for Rationalt.
However, there are several differences. The coefficients of MispricedL20t´1 in columns
(1) to (4) do not have statistically significant association to MispricedL20t while the coefficients
of MispricedH20t´1 in columns (5) to (8) are still significant. Another interesting coefficients are
Irrationalt :MispricedL20t´1 and Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1.
In column (4), Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1 is statistically significant while
Irrationalt :MispricedL20t´1 is not. This implies that the information of high cap portfo-
lio’s mispricing—not the low cap portfolio’s mispricing—has a significant interaction effect with
Irrationalt on MispricedL20t. This seems conflicting, since the information of the low-cap stocks
does not seem to have significant interaction with any of the sentiments on the next week’s mis-
pricing of the low-cap portfolio.10 Furthermore, Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1 is -3.241, one of the
most significant and negative coefficients in table 10.
On the other hand, for columns (5) to (8), Irrationalt : MispricedH20t´1 is around
0.45. This positive interaction may indicate that when MispricedH20t´1 is positive (negative),
the optimistic (pessimistic) noise trader may buy (sell) more of the high cap stocks, influencing the
mispricing of the high cap market depending on irrational’s mood. The Irrationalt’s negative sig-
nificant interaction with MispricedH20t´1 instead of MispricedL20t´1 in column (4) may illustrate
that since large-cap stocks are more visible to the noise traders, those without enough knowledge
of financial markets may take a glance of positive (negative) performance of large-cap firms and
invest (sell) small-cap stocks. Furthermore, the noise traders using large-cap stock’s information
9The interaction variable Rationalt : Irrationalt was not added because its interaction was not significant
in any of the regressions in table 10
10To elaborate, the MispricedL20t´1 variable and its interactions like Irrationalt : MispricedL20t´1are
not significant on the dependent variable MispricedL20t.
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on the investment decision of small-cap stocks may lead to erroneous and negative returns on the
small-cap stocks, on average. The insignificant interaction of Irrationalt and MispricedL20t´1
may mean the noise traders may not consider the past performance of low cap stocks as much as
the high cap stocks for both MispricedL20t and MispricedH20t.
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Table 10: OLS: Mispriced with all variables interactions
Columns (1) to (4) are regressions of sentiment, lagged, and interaction variables on MispriciedL20t.
Columns (5) to (8) are regressions on MispricedH20t. All of the regressions have high F statistics to be
signficicant at the 1 percent level.
MispricedL20t MispricedH20t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rationalt 1.345
˚˚˚ 1.493˚˚˚ 1.493˚˚˚ 1.225˚˚ ´0.008 ´0.022 ´0.029 ´0.001
p0.490q p0.486q p0.486q p0.486q p0.104q p0.106q p0.106q p0.104q
Irrationalt 0.737
˚˚˚ 0.489˚˚˚ 0.496˚˚˚ 0.750˚˚˚ ´0.009 ´0.001 0.003 ´0.009
p0.153q p0.161q p0.161q p0.152q p0.033q p0.034q p0.035q p0.033q
Rationalt-1 0.650 ´0.030 ´0.019 0.783 ´0.005 0.037 0.057 ´0.028
p0.503q p0.519q p0.519q p0.500q p0.106q p0.124q p0.124q p0.107q
Irrationalt-1 ´0.302
˚˚ ´0.157 ´0.161 ´0.271˚ 0.038 0.035 0.031 0.033
p0.151q p0.153q p0.153q p0.150q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q
MispricedL20t-1 ´0.030 ´0.049 ´0.049 ´0.016 0.006
p0.044q p0.044q p0.044q p0.044q p0.009q
MispricedH20t-1 0.233 ´0.147
˚˚˚ ´0.148˚˚˚ ´0.147˚˚˚ ´0.142˚˚˚
p0.224q p0.048q p0.048q p0.048q p0.048q
Rationalt:MispricedL20t-1 ´0.563 ´0.260 ´0.261 ´0.766 0.031
p0.514q p0.513q p0.513q p0.514q p0.110q
Irrationalt:MispricedL20t-1 ´0.144 ´0.113 ´0.113 ´0.205 ´0.046
p0.170q p0.169q p0.169q p0.170q p0.036q
Rationalt:MispricedH20t-1 0.948 0.273 0.289 0.291 0.215
p2.665q p0.567q p0.568q p0.568q p0.572q
Irrationalt:MispricedH20t-1 ´3.241
˚˚˚ 0.465˚˚˚ 0.453˚˚˚ 0.447˚˚˚ 0.457˚˚˚











Constant ´0.152˚˚˚ ´0.119˚˚˚ ´0.120˚˚˚ ´0.148˚˚˚ 0.002 0.000 ´0.000 0.004
p0.038q p0.039q p0.039q p0.038q p0.008q p0.009q p0.009q p0.008q
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
R2 0.053 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.026
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.066 0.065 0.063 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.016
Notes: ˚˚˚Significant at the 1 percent level.
˚˚Significant at the 5 percent level.
˚Significant at the 10 percent level.
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5.3 Serial Correlation Test
Due to the nature of our time-series data, I’ve tested the above regressions for serial
correlation by regressing the regression’s residual with 11 lags—around two and a half months of





xi et´i , where (8)
each xi coefficient was checked for the serial correlation.
In table 11, we see that for low cap portfolio, its residuals at lag 3 and 4 seems to have
statistically significant relationship to the current week t. For the high cap portfolio in columns
(5) to (8), while the lag 7 in serial correlation seem significant, due to the low F statistics, only
the lag 3 and 4 in the MispriecedL20 were considered. Thus, the four-weeks lagged dependent
variable was added to each of the regression in section 5.2 and again, checked for serial correlation.
An additional serial correlation test afterwards indicate that the regressions in table 12 does not
seem to exhibit a serial correlation, up to lag 11.
The table 12 illustrates the regressions after the lags. Similar to section 5.2, many of the
coefficients are still signficant. The new variables in table12 are the four weeks lagged mispricing
variables: MispricedH20t´4 and MispricedL20t´4. For the high cap portfolio, its mispricing does
not seem to be statistically impacted by its mispricing four weeks ago. However, for the low
cap portfolio, its mispricing a week before does not seem to have a unique effect on the current
mispricing while its mispricing from 4 weeks do. Furthermore, from the taking into account that the
the regressions in table 12 does not seem to exhibit a serial correlation up to lag 11, the significance
of lag 4 and lag 1 in the mispricing of the low cap portfolio and high cap portfolio, respectively,
may mean the mispricing of the low cap stocks may exhibit the price correction later than the high
cap mispricing. This analysis is consistent with the theory that from greater limits of arbitrage in
small cap stocks, the price correction may take longer than the high cap stocks (Podolski et al.,
2009).
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Table 11: Serial Lags Result
MispricedL20 MispricedH20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
x1 0.038 0.035 0.035 0.049 ´0.011 ´0.011 ´0.010 ´0.011
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q
x2 ´0.017 ´0.017 ´0.016 ´0.031 ´0.003 ´0.002 ´0.002 ´0.007
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q
x3 0.082
˚˚˚ 0.081˚˚˚ 0.080˚˚˚ 0.087˚˚˚ 0.028 0.026 0.025 0.028
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q
x4 ´0.130
˚˚˚ ´0.128˚˚˚ ´0.128˚˚˚ ´0.125˚˚˚ ´0.024 ´0.024 ´0.025 ´0.026
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q
x5 0.024 0.019 0.018 0.029 ´0.003 ´0.005 ´0.006 ´0.003
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
x6 ´0.005 ´0.010 ´0.010 ´0.010 ´0.023 ´0.021 ´0.021 ´0.022
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
x7 ´0.008 ´0.015 ´0.016 ´0.003 ´0.094
˚˚˚ ´0.094˚˚˚ ´0.093˚˚˚ ´0.092˚˚˚
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
x8 ´0.035 ´0.034 ´0.033 ´0.020 0.034 0.033 0.032 0.031
p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
x9 0.010 0.025 0.025 0.018 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.001
p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
x10 0.030 0.011 0.013 0.035 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.043
p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
x11 ´0.019 ´0.023 ´0.023 ´0.013 ´0.042 ´0.041 ´0.041 ´0.045
p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.031q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022
F Statistic 2.537˚˚˚ 2.489˚˚˚ 2.473˚˚˚ 2.506˚˚˚ 1.497 1.448 1.427 1.486
Notes: ˚˚˚Significant at the 1 percent level.
˚˚Significant at the 5 percent level.
˚Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 12: OLS: lag 4 added.
Columns (1) to (4) are regressions of sentiment, lagged, and interaction variables on MispriciedL20t.
Columns (5) to (8) are regressions on MispricedH20t. All of the regressions have high F statistics
to be signficicant at the 1 percent level.
MispricedL20t MispricedH20t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rationalt 1.368
˚˚˚ 1.507˚˚˚ 1.507˚˚˚ 1.247˚˚˚ ´0.006 ´0.020 ´0.028 0.002
p0.486q p0.483q p0.483q p0.483q p0.104q p0.106q p0.106q p0.104q
Irrationalt 0.738
˚˚˚ 0.503˚˚˚ 0.510˚˚˚ 0.752˚˚˚ ´0.008 ´0.000 0.004 ´0.008
p0.152q p0.160q p0.160q p0.151q p0.033q p0.034q p0.035q p0.033q
Rationalt-1 0.739 0.088 0.099 0.873
˚ ´0.005 0.039 0.059 ´0.027
p0.500q p0.516q p0.516q p0.496q p0.106q p0.124q p0.124q p0.107q
Irrationalt-1 ´0.278
˚ ´0.142 ´0.146 ´0.245 0.039 0.035 0.032 0.034
p0.150q p0.152q p0.152q p0.149q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q
MispricedL20t-1 ´0.024 ´0.042 ´0.042 ´0.011 0.006
p0.044q p0.044q p0.044q p0.044q p0.009q
MispricedH20t-1 0.188 ´0.148
˚˚˚ ´0.148˚˚˚ ´0.147˚˚˚ ´0.142˚˚˚
p0.223q p0.048q p0.048q p0.048q p0.048q
Rationalt:MispricedL20t-1 ´0.485 ´0.204 ´0.204 ´0.676 0.033
p0.510q p0.510q p0.510q p0.511q p0.110q
Irrationalt:MispricedL20t-1 ´0.074 ´0.049 ´0.049 ´0.131 ´0.045
p0.170q p0.168q p0.168q p0.170q p0.036q
Rationalt:MispricedH20t-1 1.624 0.280 0.296 0.298 0.224
p2.649q p0.567q p0.568q p0.568q p0.572q
Irrationalt:MispricedH20t-1 ´3.314
˚˚˚ 0.463˚˚˚ 0.450˚˚˚ 0.444˚˚˚ 0.455˚˚˚
p0.740q p0.159q p0.160q p0.160q p0.160q
MispricedL20t-4 ´0.123
˚˚˚ ´0.114˚˚˚ ´0.115˚˚˚ ´0.126˚˚˚
p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
MispricedH20t-4 ´0.034 ´0.034 ´0.034 ´0.034











Constant ´0.162˚˚˚ ´0.130˚˚˚ ´0.130˚˚˚ ´0.157˚˚˚ 0.002 0.000 ´0.001 0.003
p0.038q p0.039q p0.039q p0.038q p0.008q p0.009q p0.009q p0.008q
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
R2 0.068 0.086 0.085 0.087 0.025 0.025 0.026 0.027
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.078 0.077 0.078 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
Notes: ˚˚˚Significant at the 1 percent level.
˚˚Significant at the 5 percent level.
˚Significant at the 10 percent level.
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6 Discussions
Without the economic analysis, our results from the above regressions allow us to conclude
the following:
1. Effect of the Rational Sentiment: Rationalt is statistically significant for all of our regressions
on response variable MispricedL20t while not for the regressions on MispricedH20t.
2. Effect of the Noise Trader:Irrationalt is statistically significant for all of our regressions on
MispricedL20t on MispricedH20t.
3. Effect of the Noise Trader and Large-cap Mispricing Interaction: the past mispricing of high
cap portfolio MispricedH20t´1 has negative significant interaction with Irrationalt on
MispricedL20t while positive interaction on MispricedH20t´1.
11
4. Effect of Outside Market Information: The past excess returns and Fama-French pre-
dicted returns from the high cap portfolio (RH20t´1 and FFH20t´1) are significant on
MispricedL20t while the past excess returns and Fama-French predicted returns from the
low cap portfolio (RL20t´1 and FFL20t´1) are not significant on MispricedH20t.
12
From tables 10 and 12, while both sentiments–Irrationalt and Rationalt–are significant
on MispricedL20t, the sentiments does not seem to have significance on MispricedH20t. Thus, the
noise traders seem to respond differently depending on the market. Specifically, for the regressions
on the mispricing of the MispricedL20t–from columns (1) to (4)–while Irrationalt seems to have
the main effect13, the significant and large interaction value of Irrationalt : MispricedH20t´1 sug-
gest that the noise traders react to the information of the large-cap market and may significantly
(and erroneously) impact the mispricing of the small-cap portfolio.
One explanation for the insignificance of Rationalt and Irrationalt on MispricedH20t
may be that the large-cap stocks are more liquid and that there are less limitation of arbi-
trage (Hong et al., 2000; Mitchell et al., 2002). While more arbitrageurs can offset the effects
of noise traders—as illustrated by the insignificant Rationalt and Irrationalt coefficients for
MispricingH20t, the higher visibility of the high cap market
14 means more noise traders may
11See table 10 and 12, columns (4) through (8).
12See table 10 and 12.
13The main effect here means that Irrationalt variable is statistically significant.
14Large-cap stocks may have higher concentration of noise traders according to Podolski et al. (2009).
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concentrate in high cap stock market compared to the low cap stock market. When there are
cases of large MispricingH20t´1 value in the previous week, the noise traders may have displayed
significant presence in the high cap market to override the arbitrageurs. Therefore, the follow-
ing (next) week, the Irrationalt may have bigger influence on high cap market since they have
already concentrated in the high cap market and have a big presence in the market. Thus, the
positive Irrationalt : MispricedH20t´1 coefficient on MispricedH20t may imply that when the
MispricedH20t´1 is positive, the high cap stocks were on average overvalued by the significant
presence of the noise traders the week before. Thus, the bullish push at time t by the Irrationalt
may further push the MispricedH20t to further overvaluation. On the other hand, if Irrationalt
is bearish, the irrational noise traders concentrating the MispricedH20t´1 pushes the price lower
and selling at one of the worst time.
When the same logic is applied to the negative MispricedH20t´1 from columns (5)
to (8), it’s puzzling that MispricedH20t´1 and Irrationalt being negative results in a positive
interaction. The table 13 illustrates the regressions after splitting the effect of positive and negative
MispricedH20t´1. Now, we see that in table 13, columns (5) through (8), the interaction between
the Irrationalt and the negative MispricedH20t´1
15 is not significant. This implies that the bullish
noise trader presence and the resulting positive MispricedH20t´1 the week before translates to the
significant returns of the next week’s mispricing only when there was an overvaluation in the high
cap portfolio.
The Irrationalt :MispricedH20t on the MispricedL20t regression is more puzzling.
However, if we assume that the noise traders in the market who have concentrated themselves
move the large-cap stocks price from their fundamental value, then either the noise traders have
immigrated their positions in the small-cap market to the large-cap market or may have utilized
the information from large-cap market to erroneously judge and impact the market.
Furthermore, looking at the coefficients Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1|ě0 and
Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1|ă0, one interpretation of statistical significance in the
MispricedL20t may be from the volume and concentration of noise trader’s impact when
MispricedH20t is negative. One of the Friedman’s description of the noise trader is that they
15The variable Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1
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buy and sell at the worst time (Lee et al., 2002). Thus, if the MispricedH20t is positive from last
week’s noise traders, more noise traders may join in and also the noise traders from the low cap
market. Thus, less concentration of the noise traders in the low cap market from the noise traders
going to the high cap market may lead the current risk premium/discount set by the noise traders
in the low cap market to be diminished.
We can see this by an example as follows: the bullish Irrationalt term would
push the MispricedL20t value higher. However, when Irrationalt interact with the positive
MishpeicedH20t´1, this noise trader premium that would have been present in the low cap market
is now moved to the high cap market, leading to negative impact on MispricedL20t. On the other
hand, if the noise trader is bearish, the additional discounting from Irratioanlt is transferred to the
high cap stocks, leading to positive value of Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1 on MispricedL20t.
16
However, when the previous week’s mispricing of the high cap market is negative but
the irrational traders are bullish, the negative Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1|ă0 implies that the
bullish Irrationalt will have an overall positive interaction effect to the MispricedL20t. One of
the explanation is that the negative MispricedH20t´1 may imply smaller concentration of the
noise traders in the high cap market and larger concentrate in the low cap market. Thus, high
concentration of noise traders in low cap stocks results in the Irrationalt value to have an amplified
effect—when the noise traders are optimistic or pessimistic, the mispricing of the low cap portfolio
shifts further to the irrational sentiment’s (noise trader) direction.
Ultimately, this explanation needs to be further tested with low and high cap market
volume trades to examine if the Irrationalt and Rationalt sentiments and the reactions from
the MispricedH20t´1 have significant and main effect to the market volume. Nevertheless, the
paradox of negative Irrationalt :MispricedH20t in MispricedL20t may illustrate the impact of
noise trader’s shifting volumes and concentrations in the market. We do see that Irrationalt have
main effect on MispricedL20t. However, Irrationalt :MispricedH20t shades further information
on how noise trader’s reaction and the concentration of visible (large-cap sized) market may further
influence the smaller market—the one with greater limits of arbitrage—to deviate further from the
16The positive value of Irrationalt :MispricedH20t´1 is from negative value Irrationalt multiplied by




Table 13: OLS: separating out the positive and negative MispricedH20t-1
Columns (1) to (4) are regressions of sentiment, lagged, and interaction variables on MispriciedL20t.
Columns (5) to (8) are regressions on MispricedH20t. All of the regressions have high F statistics
to be signficicant at the 1 percent level.
MispricedL20t MispricedH20t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Rationalt 1.368
˚˚˚ 1.507˚˚˚ 1.507˚˚˚ 1.277˚˚˚ ´0.044 ´0.051 ´0.060 ´0.037
p0.486q p0.483q p0.483q p0.486q p0.104q p0.106q p0.106q p0.105q
Irrationalt 0.738
˚˚˚ 0.503˚˚˚ 0.510˚˚˚ 0.812˚˚˚ ´0.087˚˚ ´0.082˚ ´0.076˚ ´0.085˚˚
p0.152q p0.160q p0.160q p0.187q p0.040q p0.042q p0.043q p0.040q
Rationalt-1 0.739 0.088 0.099 0.844
˚ 0.033 0.056 0.079 0.009
p0.500q p0.516q p0.516q p0.499q p0.106q p0.124q p0.124q p0.107q
Irrationalt-1 ´0.278
˚ ´0.142 ´0.146 ´0.251˚ 0.048 0.046 0.043 0.042
p0.150q p0.152q p0.152q p0.149q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q p0.032q
MispricedL20t-1 ´0.024 ´0.042 ´0.042 ´0.012 0.007
p0.044q p0.044q p0.044q p0.044q p0.009q
MispricedH20t-1 0.194 ´0.155
˚˚˚ ´0.155˚˚˚ ´0.155˚˚˚ ´0.151˚˚˚
p0.223q p0.048q p0.048q p0.048q p0.048q
Rationalt:MispricedL20t-1 ´0.485 ´0.204 ´0.204 ´0.677 0.034
p0.510q p0.510q p0.510q p0.511q p0.110q
Irrationalt:MispricedL20t-1 ´0.074 ´0.049 ´0.049 ´0.140 ´0.035
p0.170q p0.168q p0.168q p0.170q p0.036q
Rationalt:MispricedH20t-1 1.570 0.336 0.344 0.348 0.286
p2.652q p0.565q p0.565q p0.565q p0.570q
Irrationalt:MispricedH20t-1 | ě 0 ´3.770
˚˚˚ 1.053˚˚˚ 1.040˚˚˚ 1.028˚˚˚ 1.048˚˚˚
p1.118q p0.238q p0.241q p0.241q p0.240q
Irrationalt:MispricedH20t-1 | ă 0 ´2.718
˚˚ ´0.315 ´0.314 ´0.316 ´0.319
p1.324q p0.283q p0.284q p0.284q p0.284q
MispricedL20t-4 ´0.123
˚˚˚ ´0.114˚˚˚ ´0.115˚˚˚ ´0.124˚˚˚
p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q p0.030q
MispricedH20t-4 ´0.037 ´0.037 ´0.037 ´0.037











Constant ´0.162˚˚˚ ´0.130˚˚˚ ´0.130˚˚˚ ´0.157˚˚˚ 0.002 0.001 ´0.000 0.003
p0.038q p0.039q p0.039q p0.038q p0.008q p0.009q p0.008q p0.008q
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033
R2 0.068 0.086 0.085 0.088 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.037
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.078 0.077 0.077 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.026
Notes: ˚˚˚Significant at the 1 percent level.
˚˚Significant at the 5 percent level.
˚Significant at the 10 percent level.
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7 Conclusion
This paper examined the impact of noise trader in the financial market by first con-
structing the noise trader variable as the residuals of the sentiment regression not explained by
the asset pricing fundamentals. The mispricing was created using the Fama-French three-factor
model. Furthermore, the mispricing of the small and large-cap portfolios was used to examine the
noise trader behavior, but also the extent of the small cap’s limits of arbitrage on the mispricing.
Consistent with Podolski et al. (2009), I conclude that the noise trader and sentiment’s impact is
more significant in small-cap portfolio compared to the large-cap portfolio. However, I note that
the substantial interaction in the irrational sentiment and the past large-cap mispricing may in-
dicate that the impact of noise trader—when concentrated together—has a significantly negative
relationship with the small-cap portfolio while having a slightly positive significant relationship
with the large-cap portfolio. Furthermore, after regressing four weeks past mispricing, I also note
that compared to the large-cap portfolio, the mispricing of the small-cap portfolio reverts back to
its fundamental price later than the large-cap. Although further research using market volumes
are needed to test the interpretation on the impact of noise trader’s concentration on the certain
markets, my analysis presents not only the noise trader’s main impact to the small-cap stocks but
also the interaction effect with the previous week’s large-cap stocks mispricing to the current week’s
mispricing of both the small and large cap portfolios.
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Unlike the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which describes the relation-
ship between systematic risk and expected return for assets, Fama and French (1992) 3-Factor Model
includes additional systematic factors, which are firm size–through Market equity breakpoints–and
book-to-market ratio.17 Since the historical-average returns on stocks of small firms and stocks
with high book-to-market ratio seems to perform better than the CAPM predictions, Fama and
French accounted for this size premium in their model. By constructing new factors called SMB
(small minus big) to account for the small firm size risk premium and HML (high minus low) to
account for the high book-to-market premium, Fama-French’s 3 Factor model quantifies the size
risk premium.
The SMB is constructed as follows. After double sorting the stocks by both market








where RS{L, RS{M , and RS{H are three portfolio returns based on small/low, small/medium,
small/high portfolios. Similarly, RB{L, R ` B{M , and RB{H are three portfolio returns based
on big/low, big/medium, big/high portfolios.18








where RS{H and RB{H are returns from small & high and big & high portfolios. Similarly, RS{Land
RB{L are returns from small & low and big & low portfolios.
Putting together, in Fama-French 3 model, the return of a stock or portfolio is expressed
as
ri,t ´ rf “ αt ` β1 prm,t ´ rf q ` β2 SMB ` β3 HML` εi,t , (11)
where
α “ its abnormal return at time t.
βi “ respective sensitivity to its factor.
εi,t “ unsystematic risk of security i in period t.
17Book-to-Market ratio is the accounting value of the company (company’s historical cost) divided by the
market value of the company.
18The “small/low” portfolio is formed by stock of portfolios that are small quantile of market equity
(small) and bottom 30% of B/M ratio (low). Similarly, the “big/high” portfolio is formed by stocks of
portfolio that are high quantile of market equity (big) and top 30% of B/M ratio (high).
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In comparison, the CAPM expresses the return of a stock or portfolio as
ri,t ´ rf “ αi ` βprm,t ´ rf q ` εi,t, (12)
where
ri,t “return of stock or portfolio i in period t
rf “ risk free rate
αi “ asset’s alpha or its abnormal return
β “ the relative asset’s returns to the market excess return.
9.2 Fama-French Weekly Returns
Since the Fama-French returns were only in daily, monthly, or yearly intervals, the weekly
returns were computed as follows. For a week i, it’s weekly return rw,i is computed by compounding


















The compounding method is from Yan (2008), and python was used to convert the daily returns
to the weekly returns.
9.3 Fama-French Risk Free rate
The variable T30, the risk free rate from the 1-month Treasury bill, is from Fama-French’s
dataset. Since the Fama-French data i is in monthly yield but the FRED data like 3-month Treasury
bill (Series id: DGS1M) is in annual yield, for the T90 T30 variable, the 3-month Treasury bill was
converted to the monthly yield to match the 1-month Treasury bill. For example, with j 3-month





Furthermore, we use monthly instead of weekly intervals since while FRED have weekly
averaged yields of 1-month Treasury bill, the data is limited to year 2002 instead of 2000. Therefore,
Fama-French’s 1-month Treasury yield data was used to to keep more data observations.
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9.4 Variable Reference
Table 14: Sentiment Variables Descriptions
Note that the variables like ∆wDividend and ∆MDividend are constructed by either taking the weekly
change (e.g. ∆wDividend) or the monthly change (e.g. ∆MDividend)
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Table 15: Returns Variables Descriptions
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